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ANOTHER LOOK AT LAWYER DISCRETION TO ASSIST 
CLIENTS IN UNLAWFUL CONDUCT: A RESPONSE TO 
PROFESSOR TREMBLAY 
Samuel J. Levine* 
Professor Paul Tremblay’s At Your Service: Lawyer Discretion to 
Assist Clients in Unlawful Conduct,1 identifies and explores an apparent 
gap in the law governing the work of lawyers: the question of whether 
lawyers may assist clients in unlawful conduct that is not criminal or 
fraudulent. After introducing the issue through three illustrative 
scenarios, which he labels “lawbreaking stories,”2 Professor Tremblay 
engages in an extensive analysis of the applicable substantive law, relying 
primarily on ethics codes, which directly regulate the work of lawyers,3 
with additional reference to other sources of law.4 Having reached the 
considered conclusion that the law does not prohibit lawyers from 
assisting clients in unlawful or wrongful—but not criminal or 
fraudulent—conduct, Professor Tremblay moves to the next stage of his 
analysis, examining the further question as to the nature and scope of the 
lawyer’s ethical discretion to assist—or to refuse to assist—a client in 
unlawful or wrongful conduct.5  
Based on this analysis, which he applies in the context of the three 
lawbreaking stories, Professor Tremblay presents a complex set of 
prescriptions: First, “lawyers have discretion to assist or refuse to assist 
their clients with . . . unlawful [but noncriminal and non-fraudulent] 
activity.”6 Second:  
Lawyers who choose to participate in clients’ unlawful 
activity, taking advantage of the state’s license to do so, 
ought to be judged by their peers, and the rest of the relevant 
community, by the nature of the harm that participation 
produces and its effect on the justice of the resulting action.7  
Finally, “[t]hat license to collaborate with client unlawfulness is not a 
license to evade moral responsibility for the acts of their clients.”8  
Building on Professor Tremblay’s analysis, this response aims to 
briefly evaluate the central question he raises—the lawyer’s discretion to 
                                                                                                                     
 * Professor of Law and Director of the Jewish Law Institute, Touro Law Center.  
 1. Paul R. Tremblay, At Your Service: Lawyer Discretion to Assist Clients in Unlawful 
Conduct, 70 FLA. L. REV. 251 (2018). 
 2. Id. at 258–64. 
 3. Id. at 265–82. 
 4. Id. at 283–86. 
 5. Id. at 286–312. 
 6. Id. at 312. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 313. 
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assist a client’s unlawful conduct—by reframing the issue through the 
prism of a three-tiered, or three-pronged, framework. In so doing, this 
response suggests that, to the extent Professor Tremblay has identified 
cases in which ethics codes and other sources of law do not directly or 
definitively mandate a particular mode of action on the part of lawyers, 
an assessment of the issue may require a close look at three 
complementary—but, at times, competing or conflicting—duties 
underlying ethics codes: the duty to serve the best interests of the client, 
the duty to promote justice within the American legal system, and the 
duty to the lawyer’s own sense of ethical morality.9  
As a threshold matter, the preamble to the American Bar Association 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) acknowledges that 
“[i]n the nature of law practice . . . conflicting responsibilities are 
encountered.”10 As the preamble further observes, “[v]irtually all difficult 
ethical problems arise from conflicts between a lawyer’s responsibilities 
to clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer’s own interest in 
remaining an ethical person while earning a satisfactory living.”11 
Finally, the preamble notes, although ethics rules “often prescribe terms 
for resolving such conflicts,” there remain “many difficult issues of 
professional discretion . . . [that] must be resolved through the exercise 
of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic 
principles underlying the Rules.”12 Thus, it would seem that the scenarios 
Professor Tremblay identifies might helpfully be examined through 
careful application and analysis of the conflicting duties underlying the 
Model Rules.  
As Professor Tremblay observes, of the lawyer’s three concurrent 
duties, the duty to serve the best interests of the client is generally 
understood to compose the lawyer’s primary and overriding ethical 
obligation, trumping other duties and concerns.13 In Lord Henry 
Brougham’s famous—and, largely, descriptively accurate,14 if 
controversial15—articulation: “[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his 
                                                                                                                     
 9. This discussion relies on the framework developed in Samuel J. Levine, Taking the 
Ethical Duty to Self Seriously: An Essay in Memory of Fred Zacharias, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
285, 293–94 (2011). 
 10. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Tremblay, supra note 1, at 275, 291. 
 14. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, 74 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 3 (2005) (describing Brougham’s declaration as “emblematic of a 
conception that is arguably the ‘dominant’ one among United States lawyers—that advocates owe 
‘entire devotion to the interest of the client’” (footnotes omitted)). 
 15. See, e.g., id. at 8 (“It is a popular, but gross mistake, to suppose that a lawyer owes no 
fidelity to any except his client; and that the latter is the keeper of his professional conscience.” 
(quoting Rush v. Cavenaugh, 2 Pa. 187, 189 (1845) (Gibson, C.J.))); see also Russell Fowler, 
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duty, knows but one person in all the world, and that person is his client. 
To save that client by all means and expedients, and at all hazards and 
costs to other persons . . . is his first and only duty . . . .”16 Indeed, various 
statements in both the preamble and other sections of the Model Rules 
support a conception of the primacy of the lawyer’s duty to zealously 
represent the interests of the client.17  
Applied to Professor Tremblay’s scenarios, at first glance, the 
lawyer’s duty to serve the best interests of the client would seem to 
require that that lawyer accede to the client’s request to assist in unlawful 
but noncriminal conduct.18 To the extent that the substantive law permits 
the lawyer to facilitate the client’s noncriminal activity, the prevailing 
norm of zealous advocacy would obligate the lawyer to take whatever 
legal action is necessary to help further the client’s goals.19 In short, may 
                                                                                                                     
Queen Caroline’s Case, TENN. B.J., July 2015, at 34, 35 (stating that Lord Brougham’s declaration 
“has been praised by defense lawyers and condemned by others ever since”). 
 16. 2 TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 8 (J. Nightingale ed., London, J. Robins & Co. Albion 
Press 1821). 
 17. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“As 
advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adversary 
system.”); id. para. 8 (describing the lawyer as “a zealous advocate on behalf of a client”); id. 
para. 9 (citing “the lawyer’s obligation zealously to protect and pursue a client’s legitimate 
interests”); id. r. 1.3, cmt. 1 (“A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite 
opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and take whatever lawful and 
ethical measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor. A lawyer must also act 
with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the 
client’s behalf.”); see also Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 
36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1303, 1338 (1995) (finding that “[t]he codes start with a premise of zeal” 
and that “the clear implication of the codes is that lawyers should maximize client interests”); cf. 
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) (“A Lawyer Should 
Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law.”). 
 18. It should be noted that, as I have observed elsewhere, “the ‘best interests’ of the client 
may not always entail zealous advocacy of the client’s legal advantages. Moreover, it may be 
proper, in some cases, for the lawyer to include broader considerations, including moral values, 
in counseling a client regarding what course of action would, in fact, best serve the 
client’s interests.” See Samuel J. Levine, The Law and the “Spirit of the Law” in Legal Ethics, 
2015 J. PROF. LAW. 1, 7 n.33 (2015) (citing THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., 
LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (1994); Thomas L. Shaffer, Inaugural Howard 
Lichtenstein Lecture in Legal Ethics: Lawyer Professionalism as a Moral Argument, 26 GONZ. L. 
REV. 393 (1991); Thomas L. Shaffer, Legal Ethics and the Good Client, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 319 
(1987)); cf. Tremblay, supra note 1, at 305 (“[T]he lawyer must have a more nuanced, and 
possibly more difficult, conversation about why he chooses not to collaborate on the project that 
fails to comply with some applicable regulations.”). 
 19. See, e.g., Zacharias, supra note 17, at 1340 (“When the codes authorize lawyers to 
choose between emphasizing partisanship and important third party or societal interests, lawyers’ 
natural incentives encourage them to select partisanship. Lawyers who make that choice can 
readily justify their conduct as mandated by the code by claiming adherence to the code provisions 
that call for zeal.”); Zacharias & Green, supra note 14, at 2 (describing “the popular conception 
that an attorney in this country must do everything legally permissible to promote his client’s 
interests and objectives”).  
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implies must.   
Yet, as Professor Tremblay further notes, the application of the norm 
of zealous advocacy loses much of its force in the context of the scenarios 
he examines, because, in each of these cases, the lawyer is involved in 
assisting the client in unlawful conduct20 and the lawyer plays a 
transactional role rather than an advocacy role.21 Thus, even if, as 
Professor Tremblay maintains, the lawyer is permitted to engage in this 
form of legal practice—and even under an approach that maintains a 
robust emphasis on client-centered lawyering—it seems unlikely that 
adherence to a duty of zealous advocacy would mandate that the lawyer 
assist a client in these unlawful activities.22 Instead, Professor Tremblay 
concludes, in the absence of a clear answer based in substantive law, it 
appears that the ethical response to the question of whether to assist a 
client in unlawful conduct remains at the discretion of the lawyer.23 
For legal ethicists, the conclusion that a lawyer has discretion over 
whether to undertake a particular mode of conduct is not the end of the 
conversation, but instead raises further questions—specifically, in this 
context: “should” the lawyer assist a client’s wrongdoing?24 The answer 
to this question entails a further conversation, taking into account 
                                                                                                                     
 20. See Tremblay, supra note 1, at 256 (citing the view “describ[ing] the norm that holds 
that ‘zealous advocacy stops at “the bounds of the law”’ as ‘the one relatively fixed star in the 
legal ethics universe’”) (quoting David B. Wilkins, In Defense of Law and Morality: Why Lawyers 
Should Have a Prima Facie Duty to Obey the Law, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 269, 269 (1996)). 
Although Professor Tremblay’s article is premised on a distinction between assisting a client’s 
criminal conduct and assisting a client’s unlawful but noncriminal conduct, the latter of which he 
does not find prohibited, the norm that zealous advocacy stops at the bounds of the law would at 
least seem to negate any mandatory obligation on the part of the lawyer to assist in unlawful 
activity.  
 21. See Tremblay, supra note 1, at 260 (“Each [scenario] describes lawyering assistance 
that is transactional. It does not situate the lawyer in the role of advocate or litigator. A common 
theme within legal ethics discourse is that transactional lawyers engaged in proactive counseling 
about future conduct ought to take a more conservative stance regarding the potential for a client 
to cross the line demarcating permitted and forbidden conduct.”); see also Fred C. Zacharias, 
Practice, Theory, and the War on Terror, 59 EMORY L.J. 333, 354 (2009) (“I . . . have 
differentiated counseling and negotiations from the advocacy setting. An emphatic client 
orientation is justified in litigation . . . .” (footnote omitted)); Fred C. Zacharias, The Images of 
Lawyers, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 73, 93 (2007) (arguing that application of an aggressive 
adversarial role “may not be necessary—or may even be counter-intuitive—in contexts divorced 
from litigation (e.g., the advice setting, matters involving transactions with the client) or in 
contexts in which systemic safeguards of the adversary system are not present (e.g., negotiations)” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 22. Some proponents of a client-centered approach might understand the duty of zealous 
advocacy to include assisting a client’s criminal activity—at least in the context of advocating on 
behalf of a client who is exercising constitutional rights, such as a criminal defendant who is 
testifying falsely. See Monroe Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense 
Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1475–78 (1966).   
 23. See Tremblay, supra note 1, at 283–84. 
 24. Id. at 297. 
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additional levels of ethical deliberation and analysis.25 As Professor 
Tremblay puts it, “[t]he answer to the . . . question is relatively easy to 
state but maddeningly complicated to implement. A lawyer ought to 
exercise the permitted discretion to assist clients in unlawful conduct 
when doing so achieves desirable results but should refuse assistance 
when that contribution leads to undesirable results.”26 
Accordingly, Professor Tremblay’s scenarios may call for a 
consideration of the lawyer’s other competing duties, such as the duty to 
promote justice.27 Although often inconsistent with the arguably 
overarching duty to zealously represent the best interests of the client, the 
lawyer’s duty to promote justice underlies many aspects of ethics rules,28 
and, at least in the view of some leading scholars, may comprise the 
lawyer’s primary ethical obligation.29  
Professor William Simon, who may be the most prominent proponent 
of this position, sets forth a “Contextual View,” rooted in the “basic 
maxim . . . that the lawyer should take such actions as, considering the 
relevant circumstances of the particular case, seem likely to promote 
justice.”30 Under this view, when a legal rule’s “underlying purpose . . . 
would be frustrated by the invocation of the rule,”31 the lawyer should 
look to the “spirit” of the law to determine the extent to which the 
contours of the rule should govern a lawyer’s conduct.32  For example, 
according to Professor Simon, in evaluating the ethics of pleading the 
                                                                                                                     
 25. See generally Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Permissive Rules of Professional 
Conduct, 91 MINN. L. REV. 265 (2006) (analyzing the permissive nature of the ethical rules as 
opposed to what other law prohibits); William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 
HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988) (arguing that lawyers should use reflective judgment rather than rely 
solely on ethical rules when determining whether to pursue claims on behalf of their clients); 
Zacharias & Green, supra note 14 (offering more approaches to legal ethics beyond the traditional 
Dominant View and the Personal Conscience View). See also Samuel J. Levine, Taking Ethical 
Discretion Seriously: Ethical Deliberation as Ethical Obligation, 37 IND. L. REV. 21, 24 (2003) 
(“suggest[ing] that the lawyer's professional responsibility carries with it a duty on the individual 
lawyer to exercise . . . discretion through consideration of the relevant ethical issues”). 
 26. Tremblay, supra note 1, at 297–98. 
 27. See id. at 298. 
 28. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“A 
lawyer should strive to . . . exemplify the legal profession’s ideals of public service.”); id. para. 8 
(“A lawyer’s responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a 
public citizen are usually harmonious. Thus, when an opposing party is well represented, a lawyer 
can be a zealous advocate on behalf of a client and at the same time assume that justice is being 
done.”); id. para. 9 (articulating “a lawyer’s responsibilities . . . to the legal system”). 
 29. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ 
ETHICS 7–8 (1998). 
 30. Id. at 9. 
 31. William H. Simon, The Past, Present, and Future of Legal Ethics: Three Comments for 
David Luban, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1365, 1369 (2008). 
 32. William H. Simon, Introduction: The Post-Enron Identity Crisis of the Business 
Lawyer, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 947, 953–54 (2005). 
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statute of limitations when the debtor admits to the lawyer to not having 
repaid the debt, “a lawyer who concluded that the basic principle of the 
statute was to spare judicial determination of claims on unreliable 
evidence might infer it inappropriate to plead the statute.”33  
Applied to Professor Tremblay’s question, it would seem that the 
lawyer’s obligation to promote justice would preclude assisting a client 
in unlawful conduct. After all, according to Professor Simon, pleading 
the statute of limitations, though unquestionably legal, may prove 
inconsistent with the lawyer’s role in promoting justice.34 If so, outright 
assistance of unlawful conduct, which would subvert justice, should 
generally be off-limits to a lawyer. To be sure, Professor Simon’s 
approach incorporates additional layers of complexity, allowing for 
subversion of the law when necessary to promote justice.35 Yet, Professor 
Simon’s contextual analysis would not appear to justify assisting the 
client in unlawful activity that is merely designed to further the client’s 
financial goals, without the added virtues of civil disobedience.36  
A similar result seems to obtain under Professor Tremblay’s 
application of an alternative approach to ethical discretion, “moral 
philosoph[y],” which “explore[s] whether a lawyer ought to be ‘morally 
activist’ and refuse to aid clients when doing so would achieve immoral 
(or unjust) ends.”37 Based on this approach, Professor Tremblay closes 
his article with the declaration that the “license to collaborate with client 
unlawfulness is not a license to evade moral responsibility for the acts of 
their clients.”38  
Notwithstanding the appeal of these conclusions, however, neither 
                                                                                                                     
 33. SIMON, supra note 29, at 33. For other discussions of the ethical implications of pleading 
the statute of limitations, see, for example, Michael S. Ariens, American Legal Ethics in an Age 
of Anxiety, 40 ST. MARY’S L.J. 343, 368–70 (2008); Bruce A. Green & Russell G. Pearce, “Public 
Service Must Begin at Home”: The Lawyer as Civics Teacher in Everyday Practice, 50 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1207, 1216–17 (2009); Tremblay, supra note 1, at 300–01, 300 & n.238. See also 
RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 242 (1999) (addressing the 
pragmatic approach to balancing substantive justice and precedent in the use of statutes of 
limitations). 
 34. See SIMON, supra note 29, at 33 (arguing the statute of limitations to dismiss a 
meritorious case “undercuts the Rule of Law”). 
 35. For example, Professor Simon calls for violating the duty of confidentiality when 
necessary to prevent a horrendous injustice, declaring that “the lawyer might have to consider 
disclosure as a form of nullification” and, in the absence of an alternative, “the lawyer should defy 
the rule.” SIMON, supra note 29, at 163–64; see also Tremblay, supra note 1, at 299 n.233, 301 & 
n.240 (“‘[P]rincipled noncompliance’ with the law is[, at times,] justified . . . .” (quoting William 
H. Simon, Authoritarian Legal Ethics: Bradley Wendel and the Positivist Turn, 90 TEX. L. REV. 
709, 721 (2012))). 
 36. See Tremblay, supra note 1, at 302 (referring to “assisting [clients] with much 
less noble lawbreaking”). 
 37. See id. at 298–303 (footnotes omitted). 
 38. Id. at 313. 
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Professor Simon—whose model, as Professor Tremblay notes, purports 
to be based on principles of justice39—nor the “moral activists”40 appear 
to find support for their approach either in the substantive law or within 
mainstream and prevailing norms of lawyering.41 Accordingly, it would 
seem unlikely, as Professor Tremblay prescribes, that “[l]awyers who 
choose to participate in clients’ unlawful activity, taking advantage of the 
state’s license to do so” would be “judged by their peers, and the rest of 
the relevant community, by the nature of the harm that participation 
produces and its effect on the justice of the resulting action.”42 
As an alternative, perhaps Professor Tremblay’s analysis can find 
support in an application of yet another of the lawyer’s ethical duties: the 
duty to the lawyer’s own sense of ethical morality.43 In contrast to 
approaches that impose upon the lawyer ethical determinations based in 
preconceived notions of justice or morality, relying upon the lawyer’s 
duty to self has the advantage of employing the lawyer’s own views of 
morality as a basis for ethical decision making.44 Moreover, unlike an 
approach that calls upon the outside judgment of the lawyer’s peers to 
evaluate the lawyer’s decisions, the duty to self defers to the lawyer’s 
own professional judgment as the primary source of guidance.45  
Perhaps most significantly, as acknowledged in the preamble to the 
Model Rules, the lawyer’s responsibilities to “remain[] an ethical person” 
and to “exercise . . . sensitive professional and moral judgment” are a key 
component of the principles underlying the Model Rules, and as such, 
comprise the third of the lawyer’s competing ethical duties.46 Thus, while 
                                                                                                                     
 39. See id. at 300 n.235. 
 40. Id. at 300. 
 41. See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, A Critique of Philosophizing About Lawyers’ Ethics, 
25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 91, 96 (2012); Tremblay, supra note 1, at 300–01 (“The moral-activism 
response . . . is frequently contrary to the lawyer’s client’s interest.”); see also Levine, supra note 
18, at 6 (observing that “[o]n a number of levels, Simon’s model appears inconsistent with basic 
elements of the lawyer’s legal and ethical obligations to the client”); Maura Strassberg, Taking 
Ethics Seriously: Beyond Positivist Jurisprudence in Legal Ethics, 80 IOWA L. REV. 901, 904 
(1995) (“Simon’s alternative to categorical reasoning, which he terms ‘ethical discretion,’ appears 
incompatible with the current rules of legal ethics.”); W. Bradley Wendel, Public Values and 
Professional Responsibility, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 21–22 (1999) (concluding that such a 
practice of lawyering “will not be normatively justified, and will therefore lack political 
legitimacy”); Heidi Li Feldman, Apparently Substantial, Oddly Hollow: The Enigmatic Practice 
of Justice, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1472, 1483 (1999) (reviewing SIMON, supra note 29) (finding 
Professor Simon’s approach unlikely to result in a substantive conception of justice). 
 42. Tremblay, supra note 1, at 312. 
 43. See, e.g., John J. Flynn, Professional Ethics and the Lawyer’s Duty to Self, 1976 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 429, 429 (1976). See generally Levine, supra note 9; id. at 289 nn.16–17, 290–92 nn.21–
23.  
 44. See Flynn, supra note 43, at 437. 
 45. Id. at 444. 
 46. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) pmbl. para. 9; see also id. 
para. 7 (stating that “a lawyer is also guided by personal conscience”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
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incorporating and building upon elements of Professor Tremblay’s 
discussion, conceptualizing the analysis through the prism of the lawyer’s 
duty to self may strike a suitable balance, deferring the lawyer’s 
discretion in deciding whether to assist clients in unlawful conduct, while 
at the same time expecting that lawyers will exercise this discretion in a 
way that allows them to remain true to their own moral commitments.47  
                                                                                                                     
CONDUCT Scope para. 14 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (describing lawyer’s “discretion to exercise 
professional judgment”).  
 47. Cf. sources cited supra, note 25 (supporting the view that gives lawyers discretion to 
determine how to represent their clients when faced with unlawful conduct). 
